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 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 10-1230 
___________ 
 
GAD DEMANDSTEIN, 
                                        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                               Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(A071-875-923) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 23, 2011 
 
Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and NYGAARD, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 24, 2011) 
 
Lauren A. Anselowitz 
Harlan York & Associates 
60 Park Place 
Suite 1010 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 
Robert A. Frank 
Frank & Pollack 
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972 Broad Street 
Suite 602 
Newark, NJ 017102 
 
 Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Eric H. Holder, Jr. 
Tony West 
John C. Cunningham, I 
Regina A. Byrd 
Thomas W. Hussey 
Don G. Scroggin 
United States Department of Justice 
Civil Division 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044-0878 
 
 Counsel for Respondents 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Gad Demandstein, a native and citizen of Israel, 
petitions for review of a final order of removal.  For the 
reasons that follow, we hold that the record supports the 
Board of Immigration Appeals‟s (“BIA”) determination that 
Demandstein is ineligible for cancellation of removal under 
INA § 240A(b)(1), and will deny the petition for review. 
I. 
 Demandstein, formerly “Gad Yahalomi,” first entered 
the United States in 1987 on a visitor visa and overstayed.  In 
1990 and 1991, he again entered as a visitor and overstayed 
each time.  In 2004, Demandstein applied for an adjustment 
of status based on an employer‟s approved immigrant petition 
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for an alien worker.  The Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) denied the request to adjust status because 
Demandstein failed to submit an affidavit detailing his past 
attempts to enter the United States, and because he was 
arrested in 1992 for attempting to smuggle another alien into 
this country.  
 In 2007, DHS served a Notice to Appear, charging 
Demandstein as inadmissible for being present without being 
admitted or paroled, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and as an 
alien who knowingly encouraged or assisted another alien in 
trying to enter the United States illegally, id. § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i).  In proceedings before an Immigration 
Judge (“IJ”), Demandstein conceded both grounds and he was 
deemed inadmissible as charged. 
 Demandstein applied for cancellation of removal under 
INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), which permits the 
Attorney General to cancel removal if an inadmissible alien 
meets certain requirements, including a showing that he “has 
been physically present in the United States for a continuous 
period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the 
date of such application[.]”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A).  DHS 
moved to disallow Demandstein‟s application on the ground 
that he cannot make this showing.  It argued that, because 
Demandstein withdrew an application for admission to the 
United States in 1999 when he was refused entry at the 
Canadian border, the continuity of his period of physical 
presence terminated at that time.  Consequently, DHS argued, 
Demandstein cannot show ten continuous years of presence 
prior to being served with the Notice to Appear in 2007.   
 The IJ granted DHS‟s motion, concluding from the 
evidence presented at an evidentiary hearing on the issue that 
Demandstein “knowingly withdrew his application for 
admission [in 1999] and terminated his period of continuous 
physical presence by doing so.”  A.R. at 49.  The IJ ordered 
removal to Israel.  The BIA dismissed Demandstein‟s appeal.  
It found that his “actions show that the withdrawal of [his] 
application for admission, in lieu of a formal determination of 
admissibility, was made with the understanding that [he] had 
no legitimate expectation that he could legally reenter the 
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United States and resume his continuous physical presence in 
this country.”  A.R. at 4.  Consequently, the BIA held that 
Demandstein is ineligible for cancellation of removal.  
Demandstein timely filed a petition for review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to 
review the question of Demandstein‟s statutory eligibility for 
cancellation of removal.  See Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 
585, 588 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005); Mendez-Reyes v. Att‟y Gen., 
428 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2005).  “Where, as here, the BIA 
issues a decision on the merits and not simply a summary 
affirmance, we review the BIA‟s, not the IJ‟s, decision.”  Li 
v. Att‟y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005).  “We review 
the BIA‟s legal determinations de novo, subject to established 
principles of deference.”  Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 
349 (3d Cir. 2004).  “We apply substantial evidence review to 
agency findings of fact, departing from factual findings only 
where a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to arrive 
at a contrary conclusion.”  Mendez-Reyes, 428 F.3d at 191. 
 Demandstein argues on appeal that he did not 
knowingly withdraw his application for admission to this 
country in 1999, and therefore did not end his period of 
continuous physical presence under § 1229b(b)(1)(A), 
because he retained a legitimate expectation that he could 
reenter the United States and resume his period of continuous 
presence.  We discern no error in the BIA‟s rejection of this 
argument. 
 “[A]n alien applying for cancellation of removal must 
establish at least ten years of continuous physical presence in 
the United States under § 1229b(b)(1)(A).”  Mendez-Reyes, 
428 F.3d at 191.  “Section 1229b(d) sets forth two situations 
in which continuous presence is deemed to have been 
broken.”  Id.  First, physical presence ends when an alien is 
served a notice to appear or has committed an applicable 
criminal offense.  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).  Second, an alien 
fails to maintain continuous physical presence if he has 
departed from the United States “for any period in excess of 
90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 
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days.”  Id. § 1229b(d)(2).   
 Continuous physical presence also can end for reasons 
other than those set forth in § 1229b(d).  For example, the 
BIA has held that continuous presence is broken when an 
alien voluntarily departs under threat of removal proceedings.  
See Matter of Romalez-Alcaide, 23 I. & N. Dec. 423, 429 
(B.I.A. 2002).  When an “alien leaves with the knowledge 
that he does so in lieu of being placed in proceedings[,] … 
[t]here is no legitimate expectation by either of the parties 
that an alien could illegally reenter and resume a period of 
continuous physical presence.”  Id.  This Court has approved 
of the reasoning in Romalez-Alcaide as a permissible 
construction of § 1229b.  Mendez-Reyes, 428 F.3d at 192.  
Further, we held in Mendez-Reyes that an alien‟s withdrawal 
of an application for admission to the United States, inasmuch 
as it is identical in effect to an acceptance of voluntary 
departure in lieu of removal proceedings, terminates an 
alien‟s continuous physical presence for purposes of § 
1229b(b)(1)(A).  Id. at 193. 
 
 As the BIA observed, the issue here “is whether 
[Demandstein], upon returning from a [brief] trip to Canada 
[in 1999], knowingly withdrew his application for admission 
to the United States in lieu of a formal determination of 
inadmissibility, so that [his] continuous physical presence in 
this country was terminated and he was rendered statutorily 
ineligible for cancellation[.]”  A.R. at 3.  The IJ held an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue, and Demandstein testified at 
the hearing.  The BIA summarized the pertinent facts 
established before the IJ as follows: 
It is undisputed that [Demandstein] was refused 
permission to enter the United States at the 
Canadian border [in 1999] and told that his 
[non-immigrant] visa had been cancelled.  
[Demandstein] was advised by an immigration 
attorney to return to Israel and apply for a new 
visa to enter the United States.  [Demandstein] 
signed a formal withdrawal of his application 
for admission which explained that he was 
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doing so in lieu of a formal determination of 
admissibility, although [Demandstein] now 
claims that he did not understand what he was 
signing.  [Demandstein] returned to Israel [for 
approximately two months] and obtained a new 
passport under a different name.  [Demandstein] 
testified that he applied for a new visa but 
apparently abandoned the application after he 
was told the process would take several months.  
[Demandstein] returned to the United States 
without a valid entry visa after bypassing the 
[Canadian] border checkpoint by walking into 
this country through the woods, without 
inspection. 
A.R. at 3-4 (citation to the record and footnote omitted). 
 At the time he was refused entry at the border 
checkpoint, Demandstein signed a two-page form titled 
“Withdrawal of Application for Admission/Consular 
Notification” (Form I-275).  Demandstein concedes that his 
signature appears on the Form I-275 that DHS submitted into 
evidence before the IJ.  This document reflects that 
Demandstein‟s visa was cancelled, that he had chosen to 
withdraw his application for admission, and that his 
admissibility was in question because of “Alien smuggling 
1992.”  A.R. at 161.  Demandstein‟s signature on the Form 
appears directly under the following language: 
I understand that my admissibility is questioned 
for the above reasons, which I have read or 
which have been read to me in the English 
language.  I request that I be permitted to 
withdraw my application for admission and 
return abroad.  I understand that my voluntary 
withdrawal of my application for admission is 
in lieu of a formal determination concerning my 
admissibility … by an immigration officer. 
A.R. at 162.  There is no dispute that Demandstein fully 
understands English. 
7 
 
 The BIA rejected Demandstein‟s argument that he 
unknowingly withdrew the application for admission, 
explaining that the argument “was undermined by 
[Demandstein‟s] conduct in returning to Israel to obtain a new 
passport under a different name, his decision not to pursue a 
new visa, and his evasion of border authorities upon 
reentering the United States.”  A.R. at 4.  The BIA found that 
Demandstein‟s withdrawal “was made with the understanding 
that [he] had no legitimate expectation that he could legally 
reenter the United States and resume his continuous physical 
presence in this country.”  Id.   
 The record supports the BIA‟s findings.  In addition to 
the undisputed evidence that he signed Form I-275, 
Demandstein‟s actions provide ample support for the finding 
that he knowingly withdrew the application for admission in 
lieu of a proceeding on admissibility, with the consequence 
that he could not expect to resume his continuous physical 
presence after doing so.  Demandstein devotes much of his 
argument on this appeal to highlighting portions of the 
administrative record -- mainly in the form of his own 
testimony before the IJ -- which he believes support a finding 
that he did not knowingly withdraw the application for 
admission.  His argument fails, however, in light of the 
limited scope of this Court‟s review.  In considering the 
BIA‟s determination, we must “uphold the findings of the 
BIA to the extent that they are supported by reasonable, 
substantial and probative evidence on the record considered 
as a whole, and will reverse those findings only if there is 
evidence so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could 
conclude as the BIA did.”  Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 
231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003).  Consequently, even accepting that a 
factfinder could conclude that there is some evidence of 
record to support Demandstein‟s position, he has not shown 
that the record as a whole compels a finding that his 
withdrawal of the application for admission was unknowing. 
 Furthermore, our holding in Mendez-Reyes -- that 
withdrawal of an application for admission in lieu of a 
determination of admissibility ends continuous physical 
presence -- controls the legal effect of Demandstein‟s actions.  
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We observed in Mendez-Reyes that whether an alien is 
granted permission to withdraw an application for admission 
lies within the Attorney General‟s discretion and is not 
merely a unilateral decision on the alien‟s part.  428 F.3d at 
193.  Further, the alien in Mendez-Reyes, like Demandstein, 
signed a form acknowledging his voluntary withdrawal of the 
application for admission in lieu of a determination on 
admissibility.  Id.  An alien‟s “acquisition of permission to 
withdraw his application is identical to being granted 
voluntary departure insofar as [he] obtained that permission 
in order to avoid the perils of removal proceedings,” and thus 
it terminates the period of continuous physical presence.  Id. 
 Demandstein argues that his circumstances can be 
distinguished from Mendez-Reyes.  He concedes that he 
signed Form I-275, but he claims that the circumstances 
surrounding the signing, including that he was refused 
admission at the border and told to reapply for a visa in Israel 
rather than being paroled into this country, show that he did 
not fully understand the import of withdrawing the 
application for admission, and therefore he retained an 
expectation that he could reenter and resume his continuous 
physical presence.  Demandstein argues that his case should 
be viewed as similar to those in which an alien is turned away 
at the border and later reenters without inspection, a scenario 
that would not serve to break the period of continuous 
physical presence.   
 Demandstein‟s attempt to evade the precedential force 
of Mendez-Reyes is unpersuasive.  Courts have recognized 
that “continuous physical presence is not interrupted if a 
person is merely stopped at the border and turned away 
without any more formality.”  Valadez-Munoz v. Holder, 623 
F.3d 1304, 1311 (9
th
 Cir. 2010); see Ascencio-Rodriguez v. 
Holder, 595 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Although no 
Court of Appeals has rejected the central holding of In re 
Romalez-Alcaide, several have held that it does not apply in 
cases where an alien is simply turned away at the border”).  In 
Matter of Avilez-Nava, the BIA held, consistent with circuit 
court precedent, that being turned away at the border without 
formal acceptance of voluntary departure does not break 
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continuous physical presence.  23 I. & N. Dec. 799, 805 
(B.I.A. 2005).  The BIA made clear, however, that “an 
immigration official‟s refusal to admit an alien at a land 
border port of entry will not constitute a break in the alien‟s 
continuous physical presence, unless there is evidence that the 
alien … was offered and accepted the opportunity to 
withdraw his or her application for admission[.]”  Id. 
(emphasis added).   
 Demandstein was not merely turned away at the 
border.  Instead, border officials cancelled the visa that he 
presented, noted that his admissibility was in question due to 
a prior arrest, and presented Form I-275.  There is no 
evidence that Demandstein could have failed to appreciate the 
language of Form I-275, which, given his signature on the 
document, is sufficient to establish that he voluntarily 
requested permission to withdraw his application and return 
abroad, and that he did so in lieu of a proceeding to determine 
his admissibility.  Had Demandstein “allowed immigration 
proceedings to be initiated against him in 199[9], his 
continuous physical presence would have been automatically 
terminated under § 1229c(d)(1),” Mendez-Reyes, 428 F.3d at 
193, and thus, rather than face certain interruption of the 
continuous-presence period, Demandstein elected to 
withdraw the application for admission and return to Israel to 
apply for a new visa.  But “[j]ust as with a voluntary 
departure, neither the government nor [Demandstein] himself 
could have a „legitimate expectation . . . that [he] could 
illegally reenter and resume a period of continuous physical 
presence.‟”  Id. (quoting Romalez-Alcaide, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 
429).  Demandstein, therefore, cannot “benefit from the fact 
that he managed to illegally reenter the United States before 
the 90-day time frame expired[.]”  Id.  
III. 
 In sum, we find no error in the BIA‟s determination 
that Demandstein is unable to satisfy the ten-year continuous 
physical presence requirement of § 1229b(b)(1)(A), and is 
therefore ineligible for the relief of cancellation of removal.  
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
